If we accept with Hart that Law intends to regulate human behaviour with the same categorical force that Morals does, the question concerning the distinction between Law and Morals can be split into at least two more specific kinds of inquiries: (a) Are legal reasons distinguishable from moral reasons for action, once it is admitted that both claim to have the same peremptory and categorical force? (b) What do legal reasons for action aggregate to practical deliberation, once it is also admitted that legal interpretation incorporates moral interpretation? This article discusses Nino's answer to this double stage of questions, and develops a critical relfection which could be summarized as follows: Nino's epistemic skepticism leads to a double paradox. In trying to save Hart's heritage from Law's justificatory irrelevance, he steps back to Kelsen's position and looses not just the relevance of Law's categorical force but its same categorical force (section 4). And in trying to save Hart's heritage from Law's deliberative superfluity, he deepens the queries of Dworkin's interpretative theory, turning irrelevant not Law's guiding capacity in the field of social action, but that of morals (section 5).