The aim of this article is to discuss the problems that cases of self-deception may arise in certain areas of the criminal law theory. First, a characterization of the phenomenon and the causes that explain its criminal relevance is offered. After analyzing the conceptual conditions of a genuine instance of self-deception, its compatibility or incompatibility with the internal schemes of knowledge, recklessness and negligence, as levels of mens rea, is evaluated. In this regard, the following thesis is defended: Self-deception cannot be the basis for an imputation of knowledge or recklessness since it is a modality of dolus antecedens; however, its similarity with negligence is only structural and is not necessarily related to the deserving of punishment. In addition to this, a contrast between self-deception and willful blindness is also provided. Finally, the article closes with the selection and analysis of some possible relationships between self-deception and theoretical categories related to culpability.