Dataciencia

Colección SciELO Chile

Persistent Protests†

Indexado

WoS

WOS:001489751000010

DOI

10.1257/MIC.20220191

Año

2025

Tipo

artículo de investigación

Citas Totales

Autores Afiliación Chile

Instituciones Chile

% Participación
Internacional

Autores
Afiliación Extranjera

Instituciones
Extranjeras

Abstract

A continuum of citizens with heterogeneous opportunity costs participates in a protest with well-defined demands. As long as the government doesn't concede, it pays a cost increasing in time and participation. Citizens who are part of the victory team enjoy a "veteran reward." Every equilibrium with protest displays a buildup stage during which citizens join the protest but the government ignores them, a peak at which the government concedes with positive probability, and a decay stage in which the government concedes with some density and citizens continuously drop out. The set of equilibria is fully described by the peak time. (JEL D11, D72, D74)

Revista

Revista	ISSN
American Economic #Journal: Microeconomics	1945-7669

Métricas Externas

PlumX	Altmetric	Dimensions

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Disciplinas de Investigación

WOS
Economics

Scopus
Sin Disciplinas

SciELO
Sin Disciplinas

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Publicaciones WoS (Ediciones: ISSHP, ISTP, AHCI, SSCI, SCI), Scopus, SciELO Chile.

Colaboración Institucional

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Autores - Afiliación

Ord.	Autor	Género	Institución - País
1	Correa, Sofia	-	Universidad de Chile - Chile

Muestra la afiliación y género (detectado) para los co-autores de la publicación.

Financiamiento

Fuente
NSF
Fondecyt Project
Anillo Information and Computation in Market Design
Millenium Institute Market Imperfections and Public Policy

Muestra la fuente de financiamiento declarada en la publicación.

Agradecimientos

Agradecimiento
Alexander Wolitzky was coeditor for this article. I am very grateful for the guidance I have received from Debraj Ray and Ennio Stacchetti. Without the helpful discussions and support this project would not have been the same. I especially thank Alessandro Lizzeri for his guidance throughout the process. I thank Erik Madsen, Dilip Abreu, Raquel Fernandez, Martin Rotemberg, Sahar Parsa, Basil Williams, Ariel Rubinstein, Chiara Margaria, Michael Manove, Juan Ortner, Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez, Arda Gitmez, Sergio Ocampo, Beixi Zhou, Javiera Selman, Gian Luca Carniglia, and many other audience members at NYU, Boston University, Pontifical Catholic University of Valparaiso, University of Chile, Adolfo Ibanez University, Western University, PUC-Rio, Cornell University, Stanford University, University of Chicago, YES Conference 2020, and the Comparative Politics and Formal Theory Conference 2022 for their inputs. This research was supported by NSF Grant SES-1629370 to Debraj Ray. I also acknowledge financial support from the Millenium Institute Market Imperfections and Public Policy (ICM IS130002) , from Anillo Information and Computation in Market Design (ANID ACT 210005) , and from Fondecyt Project 11230997.

Agradecimiento

Alexander Wolitzky was coeditor for this article. I am very grateful for the guidance I have received from Debraj Ray and Ennio Stacchetti. Without the helpful discussions and support this project would not have been the same. I especially thank Alessandro Lizzeri for his guidance throughout the process. I thank Erik Madsen, Dilip Abreu, Raquel Fernandez, Martin Rotemberg, Sahar Parsa, Basil Williams, Ariel Rubinstein, Chiara Margaria, Michael Manove, Juan Ortner, Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez, Arda Gitmez, Sergio Ocampo, Beixi Zhou, Javiera Selman, Gian Luca Carniglia, and many other audience members at NYU, Boston University, Pontifical Catholic University of Valparaiso, University of Chile, Adolfo Ibanez University, Western University, PUC-Rio, Cornell University, Stanford University, University of Chicago, YES Conference 2020, and the Comparative Politics and Formal Theory Conference 2022 for their inputs. This research was supported by NSF Grant SES-1629370 to Debraj Ray. I also acknowledge financial support from the Millenium Institute Market Imperfections and Public Policy (ICM IS130002) , from Anillo Information and Computation in Market Design (ANID ACT 210005) , and from Fondecyt Project 11230997.