In this paper I intend to link the academic discussion on some aspects of terrorism, especially the controversy raised by one of the regulations born after the remembered September 11, 2001, the German Air Safety Law (Luft-sicherheitsgesetz / LuftSiG) with problems related to moral philosophy. I will take this case as an example to show that norms like this are difficult to accept or reject without making certain prior moral decisions. I will try to raise an objection to those who understand these norms and their practices, i.e., shoo-ting down a plane to prevent it from colliding with the civilian population, exclusively based on a criminal legal theory interpretation. My objection is based on the fact that these and other situations depend on a moral response, which in many cases criminal law does not have, or does not make explicit. In the case of the Air Safety Law (hereinafter LuftSiG) it depends, specifically, on a difficult decision of normative ethics.