The computational symbolic paradigm proposes that the mind is a processing system composed of a set of organized structures that operate following precise rules to treat and transform information. In this regard, Jerry Fodor (1983) presents us with a model that assumes a modular organization of the mind. These modules are specific and innate and would be responsible for our behavior. In the same train of thought, Noam Chomsky (1995) conceives language as an inherent capacity of the human being, modular and specific, which develops from maturation processes, where the environment is only a trigger mechanism. Under these principles, the modularity of the mind was gaining ground, until it was considered the most influential model in cognitive science. Nevertheless, over time, the model has been widely questioned, as it supposes a denaturalization of psychology since its foundation is technological and not naturalistic, considering the brain as a computer system. It does not take into account the emotions nor the role of consciousness in thinking. In addition, it ignores the contribution of the body, that is, action, perception and emotion in the configuration of cognition. In addition, it ignores the parallel interconnection between multiple processing units that allow integrating information (connectionism). Independent of these criticisms, modularity led to pioneering explanatory models to understand the workings of the mind and behavior. The next challenge for cognitive science will be to complement the different processing models that allow a broader functional perspective of the human mind.