Research developed in the last decades about the object of the human estimative faculty, called cogitative, in Thomas Aquinas, has often fell into certain inaccuracies, which has made it difficult to correctly identify it with the natural estimative faculty of animals. The main problem has consisted in adequately connecting the particular intentio of sensible convenience and inconvenience, which Aquinas recognizes as the specific object of the estimative power in several passages of his work, with the individual as existing sub natura communi that, at the end of the thirteenth lesson of the second book of his Commentary on De Anima, points out as that formality that properly apprehends the cogitative power. On the one hand, this problem can only be solved by considering the methodology that Aquinas uses when he deals with human psychology. On the other hand, this connection can only be established based on a sufficient understanding of the relational nature of the particular intentio and the proper way of operating the senses in the human being that allows their ordering to the intelligence.