In recent times, several interpretations of transcendental idealism sustain that Kant affirms the extra-mental existence of things-in-themselves. It will be argued that the above is untenable from within the framework of Transcendental Aesthetics. For this purpose, I will divide the exposition into four parts. First, I will present how these interpretations coincide in this claim. Second, I will distinguish the motivations that lead to such a claim. Third, I will argue that the critical distinction between appearances and things in themselves must be distinguished from an empirical distinction. To do so, I will analyze how the critical distinction appears in the Transcendental Aesthetics and how Kant reformulates the empirical distinction between primary and secondary qualities, showing that its classical formulation presupposes objects outside of us in the transcendental sense. Finally, I will close by arguing that metaphysical interpretations need to interpret the distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves by assuming objects outside us in the transcendental sense, which is incompatible with the approach of the Transcendental Aesthetic.