Good leaders can greatly influence the effective governance of water resources, however, how their attributes relate to group cooperation in Water User Associations (WUAs) remains an open question. Using the case of Chile, we explore the factors of three non-cooperative behaviors in WUAs by performing a two-stage cluster analysis. The results describe four clusters that differ in structural and human characteristics, where highly cooperative WUAs are characterized by having presidents who dedicate more time to their duties, are more active in applying for governmental subsidies, are embedded in social organizations, have high levels of bridging social capital, and have a positive attitude toward the presidency. Our results add to the limited empirical knowledge about the role of leadership in fostering cooperation in the use of common-pool resources. This article sheds light on this matter as the results suggest that policy interventions should aim at strengthening social capital and providing incentives to increase the time dedication of presidents to the WUAs duties.