In this article, we provide results from simulations for alternative regulatory systems to be applied to the Jack-Mackerel (Jurel) fishery in the center-south of Chile. A model is developed to study individual firm behavior, and results are added for the whole fishery. Three regulatory regimes are simulated to study the short run effects associated to property and transferability characteristics of catching rights. This regimes include the application of a Global Quota, Individual Non-Transferable Quotas, and Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ), all these for to attain a Total Allowable Catch (TAC). Comparisons of the effects of these alternative regulatory regimes on key firm´s decision variables (fishing effort and harvesting among different kind of vessels) are carried out. The analysis is conducted applying linear programming tools and using actual 1995 data of the Chilean´s Jack-Mackerel fishery in the center-south of the country. Specifically, a market of catching rights is simulated. The analysis allow to obtain an equilibrium price for the ITQ market, as well as other short run effects related to the characteristics of the market. Finally, results of comparative efficiency, in terms of costs of attaining an Annual TAC among the different regulation regimes, are obtained and discussed. The results suggest that regulatory regimes based on property rights will not eliminate the catching seasonality. However, these systems would notoriously reduce aggregated fleet's operation costs. Interestingly, the results also suggest a relatively low importance of the transferability characteristic of the ITQ system, in the short-run