Dataciencia

Colección SciELO Chile

Equilibrium refinements for the network formation game

Indexado

WoS	WOS:000467495300003
Scopus	SCOPUS_ID:85060523737

DOI

10.1007/S10058-019-00218-Y

Año

2019

Tipo

artículo de investigación

Citas Totales

Autores Afiliación Chile

Instituciones Chile

% Participación
Internacional

Autores
Afiliación Extranjera

Instituciones
Extranjeras

Abstract

This paper examines a normal form game of network formation due to Myerson (Game theory: analysis of conflict, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1991). All players simultaneously announce the links they wish to form. A link is created if and only if there is mutual consent for its formation. The empty network is always a Nash equilibrium of this game. We define a refinement of Nash equilibria that we call trial perfect. We show that the set of networks which can be supported by a pure strategy trial perfect equilibrium coincides with the set of pairwise-Nash equilibrium networks, for games with link-responsive payoff functions.

Revista

Revista	ISSN
Review Of Economic Design	1434-4742

Métricas Externas

PlumX	Altmetric	Dimensions

Muestra métricas de impacto externas asociadas a la publicación. Para mayor detalle:

Plumx: https://plumanalytics.com/learn/about-metrics/
Altmetric: https://www.altmetric.com/about-altmetrics/what-are-altmetrics/
Dimensions: https://www.dimensions.ai/why-dimensions/

Disciplinas de Investigación

WOS
Economics

Scopus
Sin Disciplinas

SciELO
Sin Disciplinas

Muestra la distribución de disciplinas para esta publicación.

Publicaciones WoS (Ediciones: ISSHP, ISTP, AHCI, SSCI, SCI), Scopus, SciELO Chile.

Colaboración Institucional

Muestra la distribución de colaboración, tanto nacional como extranjera, generada en esta publicación.

Autores - Afiliación

Ord.	Autor	Género	Institución - País
1	Ilkilic, Rahmi	Hombre	Universidad de Chile - Chile
2	Ikizler, Huseyin	-	Bilkent Univ - Turquía Bilkent Üniversitesi - Turquía

Muestra la afiliación y género (detectado) para los co-autores de la publicación.

Financiamiento

Fuente
Ministerio de Economía, Fomento y Turismo
Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Científico y Tecnológico
Comisión Nacional de Investigación Científica y Tecnológica
ComisiÃ³n Nacional de InvestigaciÃ³n CientÃfica y TecnolÃ³gica
Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo CientÃfico y TecnolÃ³gico
CONICYT (FONDECYT)
Instituto de Sistemas Complejos de Ingeniería
Complex Engineering Systems Institute, ISCI
Ministerio de EconomÃa, Fomento y Turismo
Instituto de Sistemas Complejos de IngenierÃa
Institute for Research in Market Imperfections and Public Policy, MIPP

Muestra la fuente de financiamiento declarada en la publicación.

Agradecimientos

Agradecimiento
We thank the editor, the associate editor and two anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful and constructive comments. We would also like to thank Sjaak Hurkens, Matthew Jackson, Joan de Marti, Jordi Masso, Andrew McLennan, Ted Turocy and Sergio Vicente for helpful discussions and comments. We dedicate this paper to the memory of the late Antoni Calvo-Armengol. The usual disclaimer applies. Rahmi. Ilkilic acknowledges the support from CONICYT (FONDECYT No. 1181955), the Institute for Research in Market Imperfections and Public Policy, MIPP, ICM IS130002, Ministerio de Economia, Fomento y Turismo and the Complex Engineering Systems Institute, ISCI (ICM-FIC: P05-004-F, CONICYT: FB0816). This article is partially based on the research Huseyin Ikizler has conducted for his Ph.D. dissertation at Bilkent University, Department of Economics.
We thank the editor, the associate editor and two anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful and constructive comments. We would also like to thank Sjaak Hurkens, Matthew Jackson, Joan de Marti, Jordi Massó, Andrew McLennan, Ted Turocy and Sergio Vicente for helpful discussions and comments. We dedicate this paper to the memory of the late Antoni Calvó-Armengol. The usual disclaimer applies. Rahmi ˙lkılıç acknowledges the support from CONICYT (FONDECYT No. 1181955), the Institute for Research in Market Imperfections and Public Policy, MIPP, ICM IS130002, Ministerio de Economía, Fomento y Turismo and the Complex Engineering Systems Institute, ISCI (ICM-FIC: P05-004-F, CONICYT: FB0816). This article is partially based on the research Hüseyin Ikizler has conducted for his Ph.D. dissertation at Bilkent University, Department of Economics.

Agradecimiento

We thank the editor, the associate editor and two anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful and constructive comments. We would also like to thank Sjaak Hurkens, Matthew Jackson, Joan de Marti, Jordi Masso, Andrew McLennan, Ted Turocy and Sergio Vicente for helpful discussions and comments. We dedicate this paper to the memory of the late Antoni Calvo-Armengol. The usual disclaimer applies. Rahmi. Ilkilic acknowledges the support from CONICYT (FONDECYT No. 1181955), the Institute for Research in Market Imperfections and Public Policy, MIPP, ICM IS130002, Ministerio de Economia, Fomento y Turismo and the Complex Engineering Systems Institute, ISCI (ICM-FIC: P05-004-F, CONICYT: FB0816). This article is partially based on the research Huseyin Ikizler has conducted for his Ph.D. dissertation at Bilkent University, Department of Economics.

We thank the editor, the associate editor and two anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful and constructive comments. We would also like to thank Sjaak Hurkens, Matthew Jackson, Joan de Marti, Jordi Massó, Andrew McLennan, Ted Turocy and Sergio Vicente for helpful discussions and comments. We dedicate this paper to the memory of the late Antoni Calvó-Armengol. The usual disclaimer applies. Rahmi ˙lkılıç acknowledges the support from CONICYT (FONDECYT No. 1181955), the Institute for Research in Market Imperfections and Public Policy, MIPP, ICM IS130002, Ministerio de Economía, Fomento y Turismo and the Complex Engineering Systems Institute, ISCI (ICM-FIC: P05-004-F, CONICYT: FB0816). This article is partially based on the research Hüseyin Ikizler has conducted for his Ph.D. dissertation at Bilkent University, Department of Economics.