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| DOI | 10.1016/J.WORLDDEV.2019.104628 | ||||
| Año | 2019 | ||||
| Tipo | artículo de investigación |
Citas Totales
Autores Afiliación Chile
Instituciones Chile
% Participación
Internacional
Autores
Afiliación Extranjera
Instituciones
Extranjeras
This paper analyses the incidence of political factors and social capital on the allocation of public investment in the Santiago Metropolitan Area, Chile. Considering panel data on a decentralized investment program distributed through local governments and a program that is geared directly to citizen organizations, the paper explores whether investment is equally subject to electoral concerns and rent seeking under different program designs. Our estimations show that decentralized investment favours aligned municipalities where competition is stronger, but long-lasting local leaders also seek their own benefits. By contrast, transfers directly channelled to beneficiaries are free from political clout and, additionally, there is no sign of capture by organized interests. Based on these results, the paper discusses the implications for metropolitan governance, highlighting the potential role of the local social capital and a two-tier governance scheme to retain the gains from decentralization, acquire economies of scale in metropolitan service provision and reduce the margin for pork barrelling. (C) 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
| Ord. | Autor | Género | Institución - País |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Livert, Felipe | Hombre |
Universidad Alberto Hurtado - Chile
University Alberto Hurtado - Chile |
| 2 | Gainza, Xabier | Hombre |
Univ Basque Country UPV EHU - España
Universidad del Pais Vasco - Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea, Campus Bizkaia - España Universidad del País Vasco - España |
| 3 | Acuña, Jose | Hombre |
Universidad Alberto Hurtado - Chile
University Alberto Hurtado - Chile |
| Agradecimiento |
|---|
| A second lesson to be learned is how political pressure is exercised in the distributive game. The central government benefits loyal areas looking for its own electoral returns, a result consistent with the prevailing assumption of a top-down agency to increase the re-election intentions of the central disburser. However, several-times elected mayors lobby to attract funds supported by their political experience, whereas long-lasting rival mayors are punished. This bottom-up influence helps explaining why decentralized investment is rather subject to political interferences, whereas there is no meddling when grants are administered to beneficiaries. |