This work presents a phenomenology of universals, both immanent and transcendent, and discusses their importance for the contemporary debate on the metaphysics of properties. Its point of departure is an examination of Husserl's position on this subject in two works that cover two main periods of his thinking: the Logische Untersuchungen and Erfahrung and Urteil. Both phenomenological descriptions are presented and discussed. The later genetic approach adopted in Erfahrung and Urteil contrasts with the approach presented in Logische Untersuchungen because it connects the phenomenology of universals to eidetic variations guided by bounded or free fantasy. The text argues that the first perspective is preferable. In effect, the perspective of Logische Untersuchungen seems to be more adequate for the primitive pre-linguistic phenomenon of universals. This phenomenology is then extended to the case of transcendent universals. The phenomenology of universals discussed here has important consequences for the contemporary debate on the metaphysics of properties. It follows that universals should be accepted unless there is countervailing evidence.